Quantification in tactical decision making is the application of mathematical measurements and estimates to tactical considerations of time, space, and relative combat power. The United States and the Soviet Union are remarkably divergent in the application of tactical quantification. The Soviets exercise a rigorous troop control methodology based on extensive quantification. The US approach is primarily intuitive with little quantitative foundation. The dichotomy in the US and Soviet approaches to tactical quantification can be attributed to cultural and historical influences. This dichotomy has achieved particular significance in light of the recent evolution of battle. The increasing complexity and lethality of modern battle has amplified the tension between the unforeseeable and immeasurable aspects of combat friction and the requirements for control and efficiency in the application of combat power. The US Army officer sees tactical decision making as an art rather than a science, whereas the Soviet Army officer sees it as a science. The stark dichotomy in the US and Soviet application of tactical quantification can be examined in its historical, theoretical, and doctrinal implications. The US Army lacks a balanced appreciation for tactical quantification's role as a complement to intuitive judgement. The United States Army must develop a systems approach to tactical decision making that incorporates tactical quantification into a comprehensive framework of theory, doctrine, training and force development.